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Abstract 
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A considerable part of the market microstructure literature analyses the 
behaviour of dealers. Dealers are at the centre of the provision of liquidity and of the 
setting of the bid-ask spread. Some studies stress their inventory management function, 
others the way they deal with better-informed clients. Some consider only one dealer, 
others admit competition. Most analyse dealers interacting with non-dealer clients. 
The object of our study is the influence of the central bank on the behaviour of 
dealers in the foreign exchange market and on the market equilibrium. This is relevant 
to the comprehension of the effect of the exchange rate system on the pricing and 
trading behaviour of dealers, which may be seen as the influence of a macro 
characteristic in the microstructure of the foreign exchange market. 
Our main result is that, given the same fundamentals, the foreign exchange rate 
may be different if the exchange rate system is a free float or if the exchange rate is 
floating inside a band in a target zone. It may even happen that the same absence of 
actual intervention by the central bank and the same fundamentals coexist with different 
exchange rate levels, for different exchange rate regimes. This is consistent with the 
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 stylized fact that there is little evidence of a close relationship between the exchange 
rate regime and the fundamentals.
* 
Another result of the paper is that the dealer who is chosen as a counterpart by 
the central bank is not necessarily in a better position than the other dealers in the 
market, even though it has access to an additional signal. This has two reasons. In the 
first place, it is not guaranteed that the central bank has the right information. If the 
central bank is mistaken, the dealer who receives its signal will be worse than if he did 
not receive it. In the second place, the dealer that is trading with the central bank is 
more confident than the others in the recognition of an undervalued or of an overvalued 
currency, which implies a larger intensity of trading. That happens, for instance, when 
the signal of the central bank is equal to the public expectations. If they are all wrong, 
the dealer who trades with the central bank is worse than the others because he has 
traded more. We derive the explicit conditions for the chosen dealer to be better or 
worse than the others. 
Finally, and not surprisingly, the price is expected to be more informative with 
an interventionist central bank. 
We do not expressly address the effectiveness of the intervention, in this paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents a brief 
review of the literature. Section 2 describes the assumptions of the model. Section 3 
analyses the behaviour of a dealer in a foreign exchange market with no central bank. 
Section 4 introduces the possibility of having a dealer trading with the central bank. 
Section 5 analyses the behaviour of the central bank. Sections 6 and 7 derive the 
equilibrium prices without and with an interventionist central bank. Section 8 
extracts the implications of the model. Finally, section 9 concludes. 
                                                 
* See, for instance, Jeanne and Rose (2002). 
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1. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Only a few papers have introduced the central bank in market microstructure 
frameworks. 
Bossaerts and Hillion (1991) considered the intervention of the central bank in 
the foreign exchange market, in a market microstructure model. However, their aim was 
not to model the behaviour of the participants in the foreign exchange market including 
the central bank, but to test the effect of a central bank intervention on the forward 
exchange rate bias. Their model considered the existence of a bid-ask spread, but the 
central bank intervention was left exogenous. The intervention was introduced in the 
model as a change in the perceived distribution of the exchange rate variation. Our 
model is completely different from the one in Bossaerts and Hillion (1991). Although it 
also reflects the asymmetric information problem, we do not model the bid-ask spread. 
Instead, we explicitly model the behaviours of the dealers and of the central bank and 
make assumptions reflecting the foreign exchange market characteristics. We focus on 
information and institutions. 
More in the line of our model are Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) and Vitale 
(1999). They also deal with the impact of central bank intervention on the foreign 
exchange market, in a market microstructure perspective. However, the frameworks are 
different.  
Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) develop a model that holds several similarities 
with ours: it is a one-period model with asymmetric information, the objective function 
of the central bank has two components, the central bank is risk neutral and the 
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 speculators (corresponding to the dealers in our model) have CARA utility functions. 
Nevertheless, the objective functions are different.   
In Bhattacharya and Weller (1997), one of the components of the objective 
function of the central bank measures its gain/loss with the intervention, and the other 
component captures the preference for a certain target value of the foreign exchange 
spot rate. The optimal intervention is equivalent, in their model, “to the optimal choice 
of the current spot exchange rate”, because the size of the intervention must be such 
that, combined with the rest of the trades in the Forex, it clears the market. The current 
spot exchange rate influences both the gain/loss of the central bank and the speculative 
demand of the rest of the participants in the market. In our model, there is also a 
component related to profit obtained with the intervention – and that may also be 
interpreted as a low volatility objective -, but we add a component that incorporates a 
target for the level of reserves. Therefore, in our model, the target is not the level of the 
spot rate but the level of foreign reserves. The central bank wants to limit volatility as 
long as it does not depart too much from its desired level of reserves. 
In Bhattacharya and Weller (1997), the dealers’ problem is similar to ours. The 
main difference is that where we use F (fundamental value), they use P1, (the exchange 
rate next period). If we make P1 = F - which is admissible in a one period model -, it is 
the same objective function.  
In Vitale (1999), the model has a Kyle (1985) structure, with only one modelled 
market maker, and the price equal to the expected fundamental value of the foreign 
currency given the total order flow. In our model, the order flow is not observed before 
the price is set, but the opposite happens
†, which is consistent with the functioning of 
the foreign exchange market. We explicitly consider the existence of several dealers (or 
                                                 
† A la Lyons. See, for instance, Lyons (1997). 
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 market makers). Also, the objective functions of the central bank are different, although 
both include a purely speculative motive, and another kind of motive. 
 D’Souza (2002) also uses a model of the interdealer foreign exchange market 
that is based on the simultaneous trade model in Lyons (1997). However, in his model, 




2. THE MODEL 
 
This is a one period model. 
There are two assets: the foreign currency and the national currency. The 
national currency is the numeraire. The foreign currency is the risky asset. The 
knowledge of the fundamental value of the risky asset (F) is made public after the trade 
takes place, at the end of the period. 
There are n dealers, one central bank and an indefinite large number of clients. 
In the foreign exchange market, the n dealers post their quotes before they know 
the flow of orders they are going to receive. They act in competition. 
Even though the information any particular client possesses is unknown, the 
market as a whole is able to capture the fundamental value of the foreign currency, with 
a margin of error. This means that the investors' errors somehow compensate 
themselves so that the market as a whole is able to grasp the fundamental value of the 
foreign currency. 
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 Each dealer receives a private signal through the order flow from clients. The 
exogenous order flow dealer i receives from clients, without being observed by the 
others, is: 
ci = c + xi          ( 1 )  
ci represents net clients' purchases: a positive ci means that the dealer i clients 
want to purchase more than to sell. 
c is a component that is common to the entire market and is: 
c = F + v          ( 2 )  
xi ~ N (0, sx) 
F ~ N (f, sF) 
v ~ N (0, sv)  
The second element inside brackets is the variance. 
xi, v and F are uncorrelated with each other. 
The central bank does not receive an order flow from clients, but has some 
superior knowledge of certain variables that may influence the value of the foreign 
currency. So, the central bank gets a private signal: 
b = F + e          ( 3 )  
e ~ N (0, se) 
se is, consistently, the variance of e. 
Since the central bank considers the fundamental value of the foreign currency 
as given, we are implicitly assuming that the foreign exchange policy is no 
determinant of other policies that may influence F. The same assumption is made in 
Vitale (1999). 
The n dealers and the central bank maximise different functions.  
Each dealer maximises a negative exponential function of his profit. 
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 The dealer i’s problem is: 
Max Qi E{- exp (-θ.(F - P).Qi) | Ωi}        ( 4 )  
Ωi is the information set of dealer i. This information set may include only the 
flow of orders from clients or may also include the order of the central bank if the 
central bank chooses to trade with this dealer. 
Qi is dealer i’s desired foreign currency position. 
P is the foreign exchange rate quoted by dealer i. It is not a Pi because, as we 
will see in section 6, each dealer quotes the same price. 
θ is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
 
The central bank maximises a function that has two components. The first one 
may be seen as a profit maximisation component, which is present in the management 
of reserves central banks do. It may also be interpreted as a low volatility objective, 
since if the central bank sells when the price is high compared to the fundamental value 
and buys when the price is low, its action should contribute to avoid large deviations 
from the fundamental value. The second component of the objective function reflects 
the intent of not getting far from an adequate (exogenously defined) level of foreign 
reserves.   
This may be an objective function of a central bank in a target zone: it buys 
when the price is low and sells when the price is high, but, simultaneously, it must pay 
attention to the level of reserves in order not to trigger a crisis. 
We assume that the central bank places its order (QB, net purchases) with only 
one dealer. 
  
The central bank’s problem is 
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 Max QB E{ (F - P).QB - β.(QB)
2 | ΩB}        ( 5 )  
ΩB is the information set of the central bank. 
QB is the order placed by the central bank. A positive value is a purchase and a 
negative value is a sale. 
β is the (positive) parameter that expresses the degree of commitment of the 
central bank to the reserves target. 
For simplicity, the central bank does not want to get very far from a zero foreign 
exchange position and it is in that position at the beginning of the period. 
 
So, the sequence of actions runs as follows: 
1) Every dealer quotes a price, which is valid for orders of any dimension. 
2) Every dealer observes his order flow from clients and one of them observes 
the order from the central bank, if the central bank intervenes. 




3. DEALER i’S PROBLEM WHEN HE RECEIVES NO ORDER FROM 
THE CENTRAL BANK (Ωi = {ci}) 
 
In order to solve dealer i’s problem, it is necessary to calculate E( F| Ωi) and 
Var(F| Ωi). 
 
E{ F| Ωi } =  f + ( cov(F, ci)/ var(ci) ).(ci - f)  =   
f + { [E(c.F + xi.F ) – f 
2]/ [var(c ) + sx] }.(ci - f)  =     
  8 
 f + ( sF / (sF + sv+ sx) ).(ci - f)          ( 6 )  
 
  Var(F| Ωi) = sF - (sF)
2/ (sF + sv+ sx)       (7) 
Setting Z1 ≡ sF / (sF + sv+ sx)  ,  dealer i’s problem is: 
Max Qi { θ.( f + Z1.(ci - f) - P).Qi - 0,5.θ 
2. Qi
2.sF.(1 - Z1)  }    (8) 
  The first order condition is: 
θ.( f + Z1.(ci - f) - P) - θ 
2. sF.(1 - Z1).Qi = 0    ⇔ 
  Qi = 
) 1 .( .








        ( 9 )  
Expression (9) is, therefore, dealer i’s desired foreign currency position, when he 
receives no order from the central bank. It is larger: 
- the larger the signal received from the order flow from clients compared to the 
common expected value of the foreign currency; 
- the cheaper the foreign currency; 
- the smaller the risk aversion. 
 
 
4.  DEALER i’S PROBLEM WHEN HE RECEIVES AN ORDER FROM 
THE CENTRAL BANK  (Ωi = {ci, QB}) 
 
 
  In order to solve dealer i's problem, it is necessary to calculate E(F|Ωi) and 
Var(F|Ωi) once again. Now this is a more complex calculation, since the information set 
that conditions expectations is larger. 
  
  9 
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  Let us set D1 ≡   ,     () ) ).( ( ) (
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1
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D
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Z3 ≡   ()
1
) ).( ( ). (
D
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( )
1
2 2 ) .( ) ( ) Cov( ). ( . 2 ) ( . ) (
D
s s s F,Q Cov F,Q ,Q c Cov s Q Var s x v F B B B i F B F + + − + −
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 The  dealer  i's problem may be written as: 
Max Qi { θ.( f + Z2.(ci - f) + Z3.( QB - E(QB)) - P).Qi -   0,5.θ 
2. Qi
 2.(sF - Z4) }.  
(12) 
The solution is: 
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   Qi = 
) Z .(








P Q E Q Z f c Z f
    .       (13) 
 
Qi  is the foreign exchange position desired by dealer i, when the central bank is 
expected to trade.  
In the same period that a dealer decides how much of the foreign currency he is 
willing to have, he receives his clients’ orders and also the other dealers’ orders. 
Therefore, the decision of how much dealer i is going to purchase or sell has to take the 
order flow dealer i receives from the others into account. 
 
  Ti = Qi + ci + E{T
’
i| Ωi} + QBi           ( 1 4 )  
Ti denotes dealer i’s net purchases. They are orders placed by the dealer i.  
T
’
i denotes net purchases by other dealers from dealer i. A positive value means 
that dealer i is receiving more purchasing orders than selling orders. 
QBi is the order placed by the central bank with dealer i. If the central bank 
intervenes and trades with dealer i, then QBi = QB ≠ 0. If the central bank does not 
intervene at all, QB = 0. If the central bank intervenes but does not trade with dealer i, 
QB  ≠  0 and  QBi = 0. 
 
 
5. THE CENTRAL BANK’S PROBLEM 
 
What is the order placed by the central bank? As was seen above, the central 
bank’s problem is: 
Max QB E{ (F - P).QB - β.(QB)
2 | ΩB}       (15) 
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 with ΩB ={b} 
 
  In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to calculate E( F| ΩB ). 
  E( F| ΩB ) = f + ( cov(F, b)/ var(b) ).(b - f)    =       (16) 
f + ((sF)/( sF + se) ).(b - f)    
Making Z5  ≡ sF/( sF + se) , 
  QB =  0,5.(f + Z5.(b- f) - P)/ β    .       (17) 
 
The central bank does not intervene if its perception of the fundamental value of 
the foreign exchange coincides with the common expectation of the fundamental value 
and additionally, the price quoted also coincides with the common expectation of the 
fundamental value of the foreign exchange. That is equivalent to saying that the central 
bank does not intervene when it sees that the price coincides with the weighted average 
of its perception of the fundamental value and the common expectation of it, where the 
weights are given by the confidence in its private signal. 
 
Introducing the behaviour of the central bank into the desired quantity of the 
dealer that trades with the central bank, the desired foreign currency position turns out 
to be: 
 
  Qi = 
) .(








− β − −
  .    (18) 
 
The consideration of another signal - the order from the central bank - instead of 
just the one from the clients’ order flow, is the responsible for a term in (b - f). The 
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 impact of one unit of order flow from clients on the desired position of a dealer i is still 
(θ.(sv
 + sx))
-1 . The impact of a price variation on the desired foreign currency position is 
now more negative. For a dealer who does not trade with the central bank, the impact of 
the price variation is – (sF + sv + sx)/[θ.sF.( sv + sx)]. For a dealer who trades with the 
central bank, the impact of the price variation is the same expression plus –(θ.se)
-1. That 
is, the fact that the dealer is trading with the central bank gives him more confidence in 
the recognition of an undervalued or of an overvalued currency. 
  At this point, it is possible to explicitly calculate Z2, Z3 and Z4. Table 1 shows the 
expressions for all Zi's. 
 
 
6.  THE EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT CENTRAL BANK OR WHEN THE 
CENTRAL BANK IS KNOWN NOT TO INTERVENE 
 
In this case, Ti = Qi + ci + E{T
’
i| Ωi}. 
Because the market is decentralised, the prices dealers quote could be different 
from each other. However, the existence of competition, together with the existence of 
electronic systems that publicise the quotes lead to a common quote. So, as in Lyons 
(1997), if the quote is to be common, it has to be based on common information, that is, 
on public information. 
In order to find the equilibrium price that the dealers quote, we must require that 
the price satisfies the condition above in expectation. Because there is symmetry among 
dealers, this ensures that the clients’ order flows are absorbed by the net trade volume of 
the dealers. 
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 Because of symmetry, the unconditional expectation of Ti is equal to the 
unconditional expectation of E{T
’
i| Ωi}. So, the price condition is: 
( f  - P)/ (θ. sF.(1 - Z1)) + f  =   0       ( 1 9 )  
which leads us to 
  P = f.(1 + λ1),   with λ1 ≡ θ. sF.(1 - Z1)       ( 2 0 )  
 
 
7. THE EQUILIBRIUM WHEN THE CENTRAL BANK MAY INTERVENE 
 
When the central bank intervenes, the symmetry seems to be lost since we have 
assumed that the central bank trades with only one dealer. However, the symmetry may 
be reintroduced if we assume that the probability of trading with any dealer is the same. 
Then, taking unconditional expectations of (14),  
 
       (1/n).(f - P)/( θ.(sF - Z4)) + ((n-1)/n).((f-P)/( θ.sF.(1 - Z1)) + f + (f - P)/(2β.n) = 0 , 
              ( 2 1 )  
 
which leads us to 
  P = f (1 +  λ2),                      (22) 
 
with λ2 ≡ 2β.n.θ.(sF - Z4).(1 - Z1)/  
/{2β.(1-Z1) + 2β.(n-1).(1 –Z4/sF) + θ.(sF - Z4).(1 - Z1) }. 
 
 
It is easily shown that   0 4 > −Z F s .  
  Together with (1 - Z1) > 0, we find that the numerator of λ2 is positive. 
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 1 – Z4/ sF    >  0 
  Together with (1 - Z1) > 0  and sF - Z4  >  0, we find that the denominator of λ2 is 
positive. 










  R1. Even if the central bank does not intervene, the mere possibility of an 
intervention makes a difference. 
 
 
  If it is possible that the central bank operates in the market but it chooses not to 
do so – that is, QB = 0 – the equilibrium price is P = f (1 + λ2) instead of P = f (1 +  λ1) . 
  Since, from equation (9), the dealers' orders in the interdealer market are a 
function of the price level, the fact that the price is different in both situations also 
generates different trade volume in the interdealer market. 
  The rationale for this result is obviously related to the reason why the price 
changes with the mere possibility of central bank intervention. 
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   The price all dealers quote must be the one the dealers expect to be the 
equilibrium price. Since they have to decide on the price before they know the order 
flow they will receive, they use their expectations about the order flow when they quote 
the price. If they know in advance that the central bank does not operate in the market, 
any dealer attaches an expected value of zero to an order received from the central bank. 
However, if a central bank intervention is a priori admissible, the expected value of an 
order received from the central bank is different from zero, as long as P ≠ f.   
It may be that P ≠ f  and the central bank does not intervene in the market. This 
happens when the private signal the central bank gets takes the value b = f + (1/Z5).(P-
f). Therefore, if a central bank intervention is a priori admissible, a non-intervention 
outcome is compatible with the positive expectation of an intervention. Since it is the 
expectation that determines the price, the central bank non-intervention is compatible 
with two different price levels, depending on whether the absence of the central bank in 
the market is or is not known in advance. 
 
 
R2. The price informativeness is larger with an interventionist central bank . 
 
The price informativeness is the extent to what the price reflects the asset 
fundamental value. In order to investigate if the price is, on average, closer to the asset 
fundamental value with or without an interventionist central bank, we have to compare 
λ1 with λ2. 
If the price informativeness is larger with an interventionist central bank,  
 λ1 > λ2    ⇔ 
  θ. sF.(1 - Z1)     >   2β.n.θ.(sF - Z4).(1 - Z1)/ 
  16 
 /{2β.(1-Z1) + 2β.(n-1).(1 – Z4/ sF )  + θ.(sF - Z4).(1 - Z1) }  ⇔ 
  1 > 2β.n.( 1 – Z4/ sF ) /{2β.(1-Z1) + 2β.(n-1).(1 – Z4/ sF )  + θ.(sF - Z4).(1 - Z1) } 
  As we have seen, the denominator of  λ2 is positive. This allows us to write  
2β.(1-Z1) + 2β.(n-1).(1 – Z4/ sF )  + θ.(sF - Z4).(1 - Z1) > 2β.n.( 1 – Z4/ sF )  ⇔ 
2β.(1-Z1) - 2β.(1 – Z4/ sF ) + θ.(sF - Z4).(1 - Z1) > 0    ⇔ 
2β.( Z4/ sF - Z1) + θ.(sF - Z4).(1 - Z1) > 0   
As we have seen, sF - Z4 > 0 and  1 - Z1 > 0. 
Z4/ sF - Z1 is also positive. 
  Therefore, it is guaranteed that the left member of the inequation is positive. The 
condition for the price informativeness to be, on average, larger with an interventionist 
central bank always holds, since β is a positive parameter. The price informativeness is 
always expected to be larger when the central bank intervenes.  
This is due to the fact that the central bank has superior information of its own. 
Its participation in the market leads to the incorporation of its private information in the 
price, resulting in a more informative price. This is so, despite the central bank having 
an objective function that is not exclusively dependent on the relation between the 
expected fundamental value of the foreign currency and its price.  
 
 
  R3. It may be that the dealer who trades with the central bank has a larger utility 
than the others do 
 
  The utility of a dealer who does not trade with the central bank is: 
 
 -  exp(-θ.(F - P).Qi) =  
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  -exp{-θ.(F - f (1 +  λ2)). 
) 1 .( .











The utility of the dealer who trades with the central bank is: 
  
-exp(-θ.(F - P).Qi) =  
 -exp{-θ.(F - f (1 +  λ2)). 
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  Let us assume that F > P.  In this case, the utility of a dealer who does not trade 
with the central bank is larger than the utility of the dealer who trades with the central 
bank if  
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F − θ β
− ] > 0      ⇔ 
 
 [ f – f.(1+λ2) + (b-f)].(-1/(θ.se) )     >   0        ( 2 3 )  
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   For a dealer to be better when he is not the one who is trading with the central 
bank, it is necessary that  f - f.(1+λ2) + (b – f) < 0. That is, on average, people expect F 
to be smaller than P because dealers, who define the price level, are risk averse traders. 
But if it happens that F > P, the private signals the dealers receive may let them have the 
right expectations. The signal they receive from their clients will not change by trading 
with the central bank. Therefore, it is irrelevant here, and that is why (ci – f) does not 
appear in the expression (23).  
The signal the central bank receives, which is transmitted to the dealer that acts 
as a counterpart, is the other possible source of correction of the expectations. In the 
first place, however, that signal must be in the right direction, that is, b > f. If b < f, the 
dealer who trades with the central bank is getting a wrong signal. But that is not 
completely necessary for the dealer who does not trade with the central bank to be 
better. Even when b = f, that is, when the central bank's signal does not change the 
common expectations, the dealers who do not trade with the central bank have a larger 
utility level than the dealer who trades with the central bank. This is because [f – 
f.(1+λ2)].(-1/(θ.se)) reflects the larger intensity of trade as a result of the larger 
confidence in the recognition of an undervalued or of an overvalued currency, for the 
dealer who trades with the central bank. If  f < P, but F > P, for the same level of P, the 
dealer who trades with the central bank would want a smaller foreign currency position 
than the other dealers, to his disadvantage. 
 
Now, let us assume that F < P. The utility of a dealer who does not trade with 
the central bank is larger than the utility of the dealer who trades with the central bank  
if   [f – f.(1+λ2) + (b-f)].(-1/(θ.se))  < 0. In this case, the dealers who do not trade with 
the central bank are better than the dealer who trades with the central bank if the last 
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 one gets a wrong signal, and furthermore, if the effect of the mistake is larger than the 
effect of the larger intensity of trading in face of a certain difference between f and P, on 
part of the dealer who trades with the central bank. 
  
We can see that F > P is more propitious than F < P for the dealers who do not 






  The purpose of this paper was to study the effect of the presence of an 
interventionist central bank in the foreign exchange market, in a market microstructure 
framework, that is, considering how it affects the dealers’ behaviour. Since the 
interdealer market trade volume amounts to a large proportion of the total foreign 
exchange trade volume, it was important to model the functioning of the interdealer 
market.  
  Dealers were identified with better-informed traders, who have indirect access to 
several signals. This gave the opportunity to look at the central bank as an economic 
agent who has the potential to transmit superior information to the dealer chosen as a 
counterpart in the trade. 
We showed that the mere possibility of a central bank intervention changes the 
market equilibrium.  
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 The price is expected to be more informative with an interventionist central 
bank, even though its objective function includes a targeting motive for intervention, 
that is not based on information about the fundamental value of the currency. 
The dealer that is trading with the central bank is more confident than the others 
in the recognition of an undervalued or of an overvalued currency. 
Although having access to more information, it is not guaranteed for a dealer 
who trades with the central bank to have larger utility than the other dealers do. We 
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